KNIGHTS OF THE ARMOR FORCE
Armor in Vietnam
All past wars, including Korea, demonstrated that the man who possesses the mobility edge and can fight while mounted has a distinct advantage over an opponent who must fight on foot. In the early days of U.S. involvement in Vietnam (prior to the 1965 buildup), it was generally believed that the only units suited to the terrain, enemy, and area warfare environment were unconventional units. It was further believed that armor units in particular, would not play a significant role in the stability operations being conducted there. History, of course has proved these beliefs invalid.
From 1965 to 1969, there was a significant increase in the mix of mounted units in our force structure in Vietnam. This increase was brought about by three factors.
First the nature of the enemy was changed from small guerrilla units to well trained and equipped North Vietnamese army regiments and divisions. These forces still retained many of the tactics predominant in guerrilla warfare, but also rely on conventional tactics whenever the need arises. The armament of the enemy has been expanded to include modern small arms, a greater antitank and anti-air capability, more use of mines-antitank as well as antipersonnel; increased use of heavier mortars, and the introduction of artillery, tanks, and free flight rockets. Additional armor, with its inherent protection against small arms, antipersonnel mines, and the mobility and firepower to gain a tactical advantage, was required.
Secondly a study of armor operations completed in early 1967 concluded that the enemy, area type of war, and especially the terrain in Vietnam were different from those in the more familiar forms of warfare encountered in World War II and Korea. It was found that tactics and techniques were being modified or changed to fit the requirements of the area warfare; however mounted doctrine, organizations, and equipment which evolved from these earlier conflicts remained valid. The study further concluded that although the weather and terrain in parts of the country did restrict the mobility of certain organizations, some forms of mounted combat could be effectively employed in most areas under most weather conditions. Subsequent adjustment of mission assignments for armor units, based on the conclusions of the study, increased the effective utilization of those units in active combat. Commanders increasingly altered their approach to the use of mounted units as the success of the far ranging armor units became apparent.
Third- those few mounted formations in country in 1966 and early 1967 had achieved significant success in combat. Units equipped with the M113 were effectively employed even in the Mekong Delta. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and other units had proved that mounted formations could conduct operations more easily and more effectively than dismounted formations in areas such as the “Iron Triangle” and War Zone C northwest of Saigon. Operations Cedar falls and Junction city I and II, in the spring of 1967, dispelled all doubts about the effectiveness of such large mounted formations as the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The air cavalry squadron of the 1st Cavalry Division (airmobile) had proven itself, as well as a new concept for use in all types of weather and terrain, and in all forms of combat.
The campaigns of late 1967 found mounted formations playing an increasingly significant and vital role. In II Corps, for example, a battle on the costal plains of Binh Dinh province saw the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) achieved outstanding results with its air cavalry squadron, one tank company, and a mechanized infantry battalion. The tanks and mechanized infantry were particularly effective fighting in hedgerows and in the fortified villages and hamlets. Farther to the north in I Corps, one air cavalry troop alone killed over 66 enemy in the Chu Lai area during the last 90 days of 1967.
During the Tet offensive of 1968, armor again demonstrated its ability to be flexible and responsive to the immediate needs of the commander. During the night of 30-31 January, when the enemy initiated his attack throughout the republic) the main thrust of the North Vietnamese attack was direct at the capitol city of Saigon, in the III (RVN) Corps area. In responsive to the attack, the 3rd Squadron, 4th US cavalry, were immediately diverted from field operations and directed to relieve the intense pressure on the US/RVN Air Base at Tan Son Nhut, in the Thu Duc district north of Saigon. The 3rd squadron moved immediately south on Highway 4, and by daybreak had fought its way into the enemy position west of Tan Son Nhut. This action completely disrupted the enemy’s intent to seize the airbase and he was forced to withdraw. The 1st Squadron initially conducted offensive operations north of Saigon, then moved to the Thu Duc district to engage enemy units in bitter house to house combat. Throughout the Saigon area, fighting elements of the 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, supported ground unit with close accurate fire and reconnaissance.
Farther north in the III Corps area, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was ordered to move from its area of operation around Loc Ninh to the Bien Hoa-long Binh area to assist in the defense of Bien Hoa Air base and secure the headquarters complex at Long Binh. Marching throughout the night, the 11th moved south through mine fields and road blocks to fight its way into the Bien Hoa area. The 3rd Squadron hit the enemy in the city of Bien Hoa at first light and annihilated his forces there. The 2nd Squadron moved swiftly into a position between Bien Hoa and Long Binh to thwart any attempt to free the enemy prisoners of war in the III Corps PW compound, while the 1st Squadron surprised the enemy units attempting to overrun the US II Field Force Headquarters at Long Binh. This later action completely destroyed the enemy’s efforts to seize control of the headquarters complex and disseminated the enemy unit making the attack. The mobility and firepower of the 11th Cavalry Regiment, as shown in this engagement, enabled the embattled command to employ the regiment to its maximum capability.
In the I (RVN) and II (RVN) Corps areas, similar acts were carried out by such units as 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, and the 1st Squadron, 9th Air Cavalry. As the offensive receded, armored units remained in the field, using their mobility to hunt down and destroy the retreating enemy.
The pendulum swing from little or no mounted combat elements in Vietnam to the point where they represented a significant percentage of the Army’s total combat power. Armor capitalize on its extensive mobility and make the maximum use of the far-reaching reconnaissance capability and the destructive firepower of its air cavalry elements to crush the enemy during his disastrous Tet offensive and to maintain the whip hand that it gained. Until final withdrawal of all American troops from Vietnam Armor continued to keep the North Vietnamese forces off balance and to prevent them from mounting any significant offensive actions.